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Abstract 
Nowadays mindfulness has become a constituent element in various forms of 
psychotherapy, including psychoanalysis. This essay is my attempt to think about 
psychoanalysis and mindfulness together, from the starting point of Freud’s 
recommendation of “evenly hovering attention” as the essential psychoanalytic 
stance. I will look at how mindfulness and psychoanalysis could enrich each other, 
with a view to placing them within a framework of listening practice that might 
contribute to our understanding of psychotherapy. 
Introduction 
It is well-known that the phrase “talking cure”2 has originated from psychoanalysis, 
and now “talking therapy” is a term widely used in public discourses. In relation to 
talking, mindfulness practice could be characterised as aiming at releasing the 
practitioner from the bondage of concepts and words, thereby rendering talking 
unnecessary, whereas psychoanalysis, as the original talking therapy, is “full of 
words” so to speak. Does that mean they are diametrically opposite? To pursue this 
question, it is useful to consider the idea of silence and listening in the practice of 
both disciplines. 
 
Sara Maitland, in her remarkable work A Book of Silence, has said the following: 
 
Psychoanalysts (and other therapists)… create and hold the free silence in which 
the subjects of the process may struggle to name themselves... During my brief 
brush with psychoanalysis in the 1980s I myself never encountered this liberating 
silence… Despite this caveat, the capacity to create such a listening silence is a 
strange and beautiful thing. So many people, when I have asked them about 
positive experiences of silence, have mentioned this psychoanalytic silence... 
(Maitland, 2008, p. 248, emphasis added) 
                                                1	  Correspondence	   concerning	   this	   article	   should	   be	   addressed	   to	   Dr.	   Chin	   Li,	  Email:	  Chinkeung.Li@gmx.com	  	  2	  This	  is	  the	  phrase	  that	  Josef	  Breuer’s	  patient	  Anna	  O	  (Bertha	  Pappenheim)	  had	  used	   to	  describe	   the	   therapy	  Breuer	  did	  with	  her;	  sometimes	  she	  would	  call	   it,	  jokingly,	  “chimney-­‐sweeping”.	  Breuer	  has	  mentioned	  this	  in	  the	  1895	  text	  Studies	  
on	  Hysteria	  he	  and	  Freud	  co-­‐authored.	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Maitland describes psychoanalytic silence as a listening silence or liberating silence. 
Many analysts would agree that such silence is part of the analytic concept of “evenly 
hovering attention” which Freud recommends. In the case of mindfulness, silence is 
central to its practice, as staying in the present with an unoccupied mind requires a 
wordless listening that encompasses all that there is, leading to an experience of inner 
liberation.3 Thus the two disciplines may have an affinity for one another. 
 
“Through silence we speak”4 ― this phrase captures vividly the immense potential of 
silence in the context of psychotherapy. While it is not my intention to review the 
literature on silence in psychotherapy,5 it is useful to mention a classic paper by a 
colleague of Freud, Theodor Reik (1927/1968), who has discussed the psychological 
meaning of a patient’s silence. To Reik, silences during therapy are emotionally 
significant and waiting in silence is far more important a task for the therapist than 
filling the session with words. 
 
Silence and the meditative stance enable the therapist to speak, when appropriate, 
from a truly listening frame. Echoing Freud’s evenly hovering attention, the British 
analyst Nina Coltart has described her style of work as follows: 
 
Bare attention has a sort of purity about it... It’s that you simply become better, as 
any good analyst knows, at concentrating more and more directly, more purely, on 
what’s going on in a session. You come to concentrate more and more fully on this 
person who’s with you here and now, and on what it is they experience with you; to 
the point that many sessions become similar to meditations. (Coltart, 1998, p. 176) 
 
                                                3	  The	  most	  widely	   taught	   exercise	   in	   contemporary	  mindfulness	   training	   is	   the	  45-­‐minute	   sitting	   meditation	   carried	   out	   silently,	   in	   private,	   by	   the	   individual	  practitioner.	  While	  such	  practice	  may	  lead	  to	  a	  sense	  of	  inner	  liberation,	  it	  is	  also	  possible	   that	   practitioners	   encounter	   (sometimes	   severe)	   psychic	   difficulties	  during	   and	   after	   meditation.	   The	   American	   neuroscientist	   and	   clinical	  psychologist	  Willoughby	  Britton	   (Brown	  University)	   has	   done	   a	   lot	   of	  work	   in	  this	  area,	  and	  her	  Clinical	  and	  Affective	  Neuroscience	  Laboratory	  offers,	  online,	  open-­‐access	  research	  papers	  on	  “the	  varieties	  of	  contemplative	  experience”.	  She	  has	   written	   about	   the	   importance	   of	   “meditation	   safety”	   and	   has	   uploaded	  relevant	   and	   useful	   resources	   on	   her	   website:	  https://www.brown.edu/research/labs/britton/research/varieties-­‐contemplative-­‐experience	  4	  In	  an	  article	  focusing	  on	  psychotherapy	  with	  the	  indigenous	  peoples	  of	  Canada,	  Blue,	  Darou	  &	  Ruano	  (2015)	  have	  used	  this	  evocative	  phrase	  ―	  “Through	  Silence	  We	  Speak”	  ―	  as	  the	  title	  of	  their	  paper.	  5	  For	   a	   literature	   review	  on	   silence	   in	   psychotherapy,	   see	  Davies	   (2007),	   Lane,	  Koetting	  &	  Bishop	  (2002)	  or	  Warin	  (2007).	  Another	  good	  paper	  is	  Kurtz	  (1984),	  which	  helpfully	  discusses	  inflected	  and	  uninflected	  silence.	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Coltart has described such attention as “uncluttered” ― she does not say much but 
holds her thought processes in suspension while closely attending to the patient. The 
invocation of meditation, without specifically bringing in Buddhist philosophy, is 
probably what many psychotherapists have been doing for a long time. 
 
In the rest of the paper, I will discuss a number of publications about evenly hovering 
attention and also about mindfulness, and explore the mutual affinities between the 
two. While inevitably this will not be an exhaustive review of all the relevant issues, I 
hope my exploration would provide useful signposts for the interested reader. 
Talking and Listening 
Talking is essential to the practice of psychotherapy, but it is not simply a matter of 
words being uttered. Fundamentally, it is a state of communion between partners in 
conversation ― it constitutes a presence that involves the whole of the participants’ 
being. Bromberg (1994) declares that, in psychoanalysis, speaking is “not simply a 
process of delivering content. It is also a relational act that shapes the content of what 
is spoken about” (p. 524). He refers to the imperative attributed to Socrates ― 
“Speak! That I may see you!” ― as central to psychotherapy. Speaking (and listening) 
is not information exchange, but a revelation (a presenting) of the self. 
 
Consciousness is always a now experience, a “this-moment” state of mind. Working 
within the psychotherapeutic frame entails a lingering in the present ― to be here, 
and with this person. Presence is a quality of being felt by the other, of fully 
inhabiting this now moment, and of showing (presenting) the self. Crucially, it gives 
time to the partner in conversation: a sense of waiting, respecting the rhythm of what 
is unfolding, with a tentativeness that offers space, both temporal and imaginative, for 
the emergence of what is important. Speaking does not have to happen continuously 
― the silence of waiting, as much as words, is part and parcel of presence.  
 
To be open to novel possibilities in this fully present manner requires a depth of 
listening that the psychotherapist has to learn to achieve. But listening has become 
neglected in healthcare environments where the concept of “managed care” has 
become hegemonic. Graybar & Leonard (2005) comment that during difficult 
moments in therapy, it is tempting for all therapists, whether experienced and 
inexperienced, “to bypass such discomfort by letting go of listening and giving in to 
the reflex to speak, advise, or lecture” (p. 14). 
 
Graybar and Leonard argue that the ubiquity of drug therapies and the popularity of 
brief, manualised “empirically-supported treatments” (ESTs) have together subverted 
the practice of proper listening in mental healthcare. Although the quality of the 
therapeutic relationship (rather than specific therapy techniques or “ingredients”) is 
the best predictor of therapy outcomes, 6  managers are convinced that quick 
                                                6	  There	   is	   an	   ongoing	   debate	   within	   the	   psychotherapy	   research	   community	  regarding	  the	  comparative	  effectiveness	  of	  various	  forms	  of	  psychotherapy.	  One	  enduring	   argument	   is	   the	   proposition	   that	   “common	   factors”	   (or	   “non-­‐specific	  factors”)	   underlying	   all	   therapies	   are	   much	   more	   important	   than	   modality-­‐specific	   elements	   in	  producing	  positive	   therapeutic	   outcomes	   (the	   “Dodo	  Bird”	  verdict).	  In	  a	  2002	  issue	  of	  the	  journal	  Clinical	  Psychology:	  Science	  and	  Practice,	  a	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(programmed), cost-effective (cheap), technique-oriented (manualised) treatments for 
psychological distress are the only option, in a cultural context where speed and 
technology trump everything else. While this trend, which has more to do with 
“business” than “care”, is most dominant in the United States, it is clearly gaining 
traction in the UK. 
 
Within the “managed care” model, the kind of psychotherapeutic listening, where the 
therapist’s own assumptions are suspended, her attention finely tuned to the patient’s 
(unconscious) narrative, and the latter’s (sometimes tortuous) revelation accepted with 
openness, where the patient’s experiences count, and where the therapist is not the 
“boss” but a fellow-traveller, has often been summarily dismissed as unnecessary 
luxury. 
Free Association and Evenly Hovering Attention 
To counter the decline of listening in psychotherapy, it would be instructive to go 
back to Freud’s recommendation of “impartially suspended attention”, which he sees 
as the analytic stance that psychoanalysts should adopt.7 
 
Most therapists, even outside of psychoanalysis, know that free association is the 
fundamental rule for the patient in analysis: she has to say whatever comes to mind 
without holding back. The other side of the free association coin is evenly hovering 
attention, which can be characterised as the analyst’s free association that enables her 
to catch the drift of the patient’s unconscious.8 Thus the freely proffered thoughts, 
gestures, feelings, memories, dreams, questions, tangents, ravings, grimaces, 
mumblings, etc from the patient are met with a completely open and accepting 
attitude on the part of the listening analyst. Analysis, in the sense of bringing 
(interpretative) coherence to the patient’s story, takes place when the analyst reflects 
on the session (or on the whole analysis) afterwards. In Freud’s own words, 
psychoanalytic attention “rejects all aids, even note-taking, and consists simply of not 
                                                                                                                                       number	   of	   papers	   from	  opposite	   sides	   of	   this	   debate	  were	   helpfully	   published	  together	  (Beutler,	  2002; Chambless,	  2002;	  Klein,	  2002;	  Luborsky,	  2002;	  Messer,	  2002;	   Rounsaville	   &	   Carroll.	   2002	   and	   Schneider,	   2002).	   Catty	   (2004)	   and	  McAleavey	  &	  Castonguay	  (2015)	  have	  also	  provided	  relevant	  discussions	  on	  the	  debate.	  Richard	  Bentall	   (2009),	  when	  commenting	  on	   this	   issue,	  has	  concluded	  that	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   quality	   of	   the	   therapeutic	   relationship	   is	   beyond	  dispute	  (pp.	  244-­‐249).	  7	  Freud	   has	   used	   the	   term	   gleichschwebende	   Aufmerksamkeit	   in	   his	   writings	  (variously	   translated	   as	   “evenly	   hovering	   attention”,	   “free-­‐floating	   attention”,	  “evenly	   suspended	   attention”,	   or	   “impartially	   suspended	   attention”),	   and	   the	  most	  quoted	   is	  his	  1912	  paper	  on	   treatment	   techniques	   for	  doctors.	  Here	   I	  am	  using	  the	  2002	  “New	  Penguin	  Freud”	  translation	  (under	  the	  general	  editorship	  of	  Adam	  Phillips),	   titled	   “Advice	   to	  Doctors	  on	  Psychoanalytic	  Treatment”.	   (In	   the	  Strachey	   Standard	   Edition,	   the	   title	   is	   “Recommendations	   to	   Physicians	  Practising	  Psycho-­‐Analysis”.)	  8	  Catching	   the	  drift	   of	   the	   patient’s	   unconscious	   is	   a	   phrase	   Christopher	   Bollas	  (1992,	   2009)	   has	   used	   to	   talk	   about	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   analyst’s	   free	  association	  in	  the	  analytic	  process.	  
Language and Psychoanalysis, 2019, 8 (1), 1-26. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.7565/landp.v8i1.1590 
 
5 
focusing on anything in particular, but giving everything the same kind of ‘impartially 
suspended attention’” (Freud, 1912/2002, p. 33). 
 
Mark Epstein (1984) comments that such attention is not passive or allowing the mind 
to wander, but “to give ‘equal notice’ to every object of awareness for hours at a 
time” (p. 195). In his view, “[e]venly suspended attention has received curiously little 
attention from the analytic community over the years” (p. 197). But in fact there are a 
number of early psychoanalysts who have discussed the concept at length or made 
attempt to develop it further. For example, Wilfred Bion (1967), a British 
psychoanalyst, has formulated the concept of “without memory and desire” as the 
analytic listening frame (see next section), and Theodor Reik (1948) has developed 
the idea of listening with the third ear as an extension of Freud’s analytic attention.9 
The focus of Reik’s book Listening with the Third Ear10 is to “investigate the 
unconscious processes of the psychoanalyst himself” (Reik, 1948, p. x). However, 
Epstein (1984) disagrees with Reik’s “searchlight” metaphor. He comments that this 
metaphor has the connotation of selective attention (searching) which is counter to 
Freud’s evenly hovering attention. To Epstein, Buddhist meditation is closer to what 
Freud has described. 
 
Another concept, “analytic neutrality” (or the principle of “abstinence”), is also 
related to the idea of evenly hovering attention. Psychoanalysts have debated about 
whether neutrality is too passive and therefore off-putting to patients. While 
cautioning against aloofness, remoteness, blankness and anonymity (likely to be 
experienced as persecuting), Greenberg (1986) believes that neutrality is “the ideal 
atmosphere within the context of a particular understanding of the analytic process, 
one in which self-knowledge is the goal” (p. 81). In this regard, holding evenly 
hovering attention is an expression of neutrality, and is essential for helping the 
analysand achieve self-knowledge. However, Greenberg is aware that the analyst 
adopting a neutral stance does not mean she is not influencing the patient.11 Although 
he acknowledges that the analyst influencing the analytic process is unavoidable, he 
argues that neutrality (quiet attentiveness) constitutes a beneficial (therefore 
acceptable) form of influence. 
 
While evenly hovering attention is seen as an attitude expressing openness, receptivity 
and presence, it is not without its detractors. In Sándor Ferenczi’s Clinical Diary, his 
first entry (dated 7 January 1932) contains a strong criticism against the “so-called 
free-floating attention, which ultimately amounts to no attention at all, and which is 
certainly inadequate to the highly emotional character of the analysand’s 
communications, often brought out only with the greatest difficulty” (Ferenczi, 1988, 
                                                9	  Reik’s	  work	   is	  not	  widely	  discussed	  nowadays,	   see	  Kyle	  Arnold	   (2006),	  Rajan	  Gupta	  (2008)	  or	  Jeremy	  Safran	  (2011)	  for	  helpful	  reviews	  on	  Reik.	  10	  The	   expression	   “third	   ear”	   is	   made	   famous	   by	   the	   19th	   Century	   German	  philosopher	  Friedrich	  Nietzsche’s	  lament	  about	  the	  poor	  literary	  quality	  of	  books	  written	   by	   his	   compatriots:	   “What	   a	   torment	   books	  written	   in	   German	   are	   for	  him	  who	  has	  a	  third	  ear”	  (Nietzsche,	  1886/1973,	  p.	  159).	  11	  Not	  influencing	  the	  patient’s	  free	  association	  or	  the	  course/aim	  of	  the	  analysis	  is	  a	  basic	  principle	  within	  the	  psychoanalytic	  framework.	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p. 1). This was Ferenczi’s veiled attack on Freud himself, implying that the latter was 
an insensitive analyst hiding behind the front of free-floating attention.12 
 
Despite Ferenczi’s criticism, it should not be impossible for a therapist to hold on to a 
truly receptive listening attitude with sincere and warm engagement with the patient. 
Such attention does not have to be a passive attitude that conveys indifference, 
distancing or boredom. The important thing is how to cultivate an honest openness 
that sustains genuine relating. The work of Peter Lomas (1981, 1994 and 1999) is a 
good illustration of sensitive analytic practice.  
 
Looking from another angle, evenly suspended psychoanalytic listening is based on 
what Reik’s has described as “social sense” and “rhythmic sensitivity” which jointly 
determine “the right moment to communicate an interpretation” (Arnold, 2006, p. 
755). The German word Reik has used is Takt which means both “rhythm” and 
“social tact”. To Reik, timing is of crucial importance and he has talked about 
grasping “the psychological moment” guided by Takt. In listening, the 
psychotherapist has to be tactful and be able to follow the rhythm of the therapeutic 
process. In Reik’s words, this is listening with the “third ear” ― a way of staying in 
the present, often in silence, and yet closely aligned with psychological time.13 
 
The British literary critic James Wood suggests that “novelists and readers must 
develop their own third ears” and  
 
read musically, testing the precision and rhythm of a sentence, listening for the 
almost inaudible rustle of historical association clinging to the hems of modern 
words, attending to patterns, repetitions, echoes, deciding why a metaphor is 
successful and another is not, judging how the perfect placement of the right verb 
or adjective seals a sentence with mathematical finality. (Wood, 2008, p. 137-138, 
emphasis added) 
 
Although Wood is talking about literature, I would suggest that this passage can serve 
as an apposite description of Reik’s “third-ear listening” that should underpin 
psychotherapeutic practice.  
                                                12	  The	  fraught	  relationship	  between	  Freud	  and	  Ferenczi	  (and	  between	  Freud	  and	  other	   early	   analysts	   such	   as	   Jung	   or	   Rank)	   had	   largely	   to	   do	   with	   Freud’s	  absolute	  demand	  of	  unquestioning	  loyalty	  from	  his	  followers.	  Ever	  the	  infallible	  Father	  of	  Psychoanalysis,	  Freud	  made	  it	  clear	  that	  anybody	  who	  disagreed	  with	  him	  was	  unacceptable	  (in	  Freud’s	  2	  October	  1932	  letter	  to	  Ferenczi,	  he	  accused	  the	   latter	   thus:	   “you	   have	   systematically	   turned	   away	   from	   me”	   ―	   quoted	   in	  Dupont,	  1988,	  p.	  xvii).	  13	  For	  an	  exposition	  on	  Reik’s	  idea	  about	  rhythm	  and	  Takt,	  see	  Sloma	  (2010).	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Without Memory and Desire 
Taking Freud’s evenly hovering attention seriously, Bion (1967) famously talked 
about the need to discard memory and desire when starting each and every analytic 
session. It is Bion’s belief that “[p]sychoanalytic ‘observation’ is concerned neither 
with what has happened nor with what is going to happen but with what is happening” 
(Bion, 1967, p. 272). What happens now in the session is the focus, and so “[e]very 
session attended by the psychoanalyst must have no history and no future” (p. 272). 
This rule of “without memory and desire” will facilitate the evolution of something 
significant out of the “darkness and formlessness” of the session. Bion’s dictum 
echoes Freud’s view that “if you follow your expectations, you run the risk of never 
finding out anything you do not know already; if you follow your inclinations, then 
you are bound to distort whatever you perceive” (Freud, 1912/2002, p. 34). 
 
However, keeping a completely empty mind is impossible. The issue of memory is not 
a trivial one. In Freud’s Advice to Doctors on Psychoanalytic Treatment (1912/2002), 
he said note-taking should not be carried out during the session (presumably it could 
be done afterwards); he also cautioned against engaging in “research” or “scientific” 
work during treatment ― such work is only allowed after the completion of the case. 
The analyst should proceed as if she has no plan/agenda in mind. But is this really 
feasible? 
 
There are two problems here. Freud’s “scientific research” consists only of his case 
studies, and this work represents his theory-building effort. But how are research data 
to be collected ― simply by the analyst’s subsequent recollection? Is the analyst able 
to trust her ability to retain all the important information without distortion through 
months (if not years) of therapy? If she does write notes after each session, should she 
not read them while treatment is ongoing? If the rule is to have no plan (without 
memory and desire), perhaps the analyst should not write any notes until after the 
completion of the case? But “completion” probably means the analyst has already 
arrived at a conclusion or formulation about the patient’s problem. As Freud has 
written up his cases in a way that conforms to his ideas, they are “data” that would 
inevitably confirm his beliefs. Thus his “research” involves a circularity that is not a 
rigorous testing of his theory 
 
The other problem is, if the analyst does write notes after each session, and does read 
them, is it possible to stop hypotheses from forming in her mind during sessions? Is 
“without memory and desire” humanly possible? If psychoanalysis has made any 
contribution to human understanding, it is its focus on the unconscious aspect of 
mental life.14 In this regard, the reflexive question is how an analyst could be sure her 
unconscious has not led her in a particular (perhaps erroneous) direction if she does 
consult her (subjective) notes before a session.  
 
It is important to say here that Bion’s stipulation of without memory and desire, like 
Freud’s evenly hovering attention, must not become an excuse for sloppy work. 
Hooke (no date) usefully suggests that Bion’s rule is paradoxical and not literal. It has 
                                                14 	  As	   Otto	   Kernberg	   (2014)	   puts	   it,	   “[a]	   central,	   unifying	   concept	   of	   all	  psychoanalytic	   approaches	   is	   the	   theory	   of	   the	   dynamic	   unconscious	   and	   its	  influence	  on	  conscious	  life”	  (p.	  11).	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more to do with the analyst’s “complete availability and openness to the patient” 
(Hooke, n.d., p. 7) rather than abdicating her responsibility to hold things in mind 
(i.e., to remember).   
 
Both Freud and Bion have remarked that their respective recommendation is distilled 
from extensive practice. But as Hooke has pointed out, “what happens in the 
consulting room and what is theorized and gets written is often different” (Hooke, 
n.d., p. 7). Indeed, reading Freud’s cases does not always give the impression of him 
showing neutrality, openness and receptivity; rather, he always resolutely brings his 
theory to bear on his patient in the analytic session.15 Every psychotherapist has to 
honestly tackle the risk of her preconceived ideas influencing therapy negatively. In 
doing so, reflexivity and negative capability are indispensable. 
Negative Capability 
While acknowledging the importance of Freud’s recommendation, Robert Hobson 
(1985), a British psychotherapist from the Jungian tradition, has highlighted the 
importance of negative capability that therapists should cultivate. This is a concept 
borrowed from the poet John Keats, which signifies the capacity to stay with 
uncertainties, mysteries and doubts without any “irritable reaching for fact or reason”. 
It is plausible to suggest that such openness is the prerequisite for genuine evenly 
hovering attention. Negative capability is also what Bion has recommended, not only 
as a discipline for therapeutic listening, but as the analyst’s way of life (Symington & 
Symington, 1996, p. 169). 
 
However, negative capability does not mean not working hard. The active nature of 
evenly hovering attention is clarified in Hobson’s (1985) description of how the 
therapist’s attention should be receptive of the “minute particulars” that emerge in the 
session. Hobson has developed the concept of “aloneness-togetherness” which 
characterises the clinical encounter as one where the therapist is alone within her own 
world of reverie but is at the same time together with and responsive to the patient.16 
 
In a recent article in the British Psychoanalytic Council newsletter, Kernberg (2014) 
has sounded a warning: 
 
There is a naïve assumption that the analyst listening with evenly suspended 
attention, or with an effort to enter each session ‘without memory or desire’, open 
to reverie on the patient’s material, will provide the essential and exclusive 
                                                15	  Although	   Freud	   has	   said	   (as	   quoted	   above),	   “if	   you	   follow	   your	   inclinations,	  then	   you	   are	   bound	   to	   distort	  whatever	   you	   perceive”	   (1912/2002,	   p.	   34),	   he	  often	  does	  not	  follow	  his	  own	  advice	  and	  only	  sees	  his	  patients	  through	  the	  lens	  of	  his	  theory.	  	  16	  Hobson	  (1985)	  explains	  his	  concept	  of	  aloneness-­‐togetherness	  thus:	  “to	  know	  a	  person	  is	  to	  be	  alone	  and	  yet	  together;	  a	  personal	  dialogue	  both	  expressing	  and	  promoting	   a	   relationship	   of	   aloneness-­‐togetherness…	   an	   apprehension	   of	  distinction	  and	  of	  mutuality,	   of	   autonomy	  and	  of	   reciprocity,	   of	   identity	   and	  of	  sharing”	  (p.	  26).	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precondition on which psychoanalytic understanding and interpretation are based. I 
believe that this assumption is a bias derived from a lack of understanding of what a 
clear and precise technical approach means. (Kernberg, 2014, p. 11) 
 
What Kernberg is saying here is that maintaining an evenly hovering attention is 
necessary but not sufficient; there is a need to develop a more sophisticated 
framework to enhance the disciplined skills-training of analysts. Perhaps one useful 
framework to consider is Patrick Casement’s idea of the “internal supervisor” (see, 
e.g., Casement, 1985), which has the potential of being adopted by, and adapted for, a 
range of psychotherapeutic approaches.17 
A Word about Words 
Freud has used the metaphor of the analyst as a telephone receiver to describe 
impartially suspended attention (Freud, 1912/2002, p. 37). This has been criticised by 
a number of analysts. For example, Filip Geerardyn (2002) has pointed out that 
telephony involves the encoding of an already fixed message, which is then 
electrically transmitted, and finally decoded by the telephone receiver according to a 
set of predetermined parameters, whereas in analysis meaning is fluid, not pre-fixed, 
but emerges in the context of communication, and more than likely emerging 
differently for the patient and the analyst. 
 
Similarly, Fred Griffin (2016)18 rejects Freud’s telephone receiver metaphor as too 
passive, and has stated that “psychoanalytic listening involves acts of sensibility, 
engagement and imagination” (p. 3). He construes the analytic subject not as hidden 
inside the analysand’s psyche, but as being constantly created, intersubjectively, 
within the flux of the transference-countertransference matrix. He believes that 
analysts tend to resort to “content-driven theoretical models” or “impoverished 
fictions” in times of clinical impasse or confusion, which lead to reductive 
interpretations. Griffin suggests that analysts should learn from good literature, 
particularly the novel, where close reading of the “dimensional universes of human 
experience” offers the practitioner the much needed sensibility training. 
 
The views propounded by Griffin and Geerardyn are more in tune with respect for the 
unknowability of the human person. To ponder further on Griffin’s point about “acts 
of sensibility, engagement and imagination”, it is relevant to consider what the 
Jungian analyst Barry Proner has said in his aptly titled essay “A word about words”. 
Proner (2006) presents a view that the active task of evenly hovering attention has to 
do with listening to words, both the patient’s and the analyst’s own. But it is 
important to attend to the vicissitude of words: “Words both unite and separate. They 
can be both symbolic and concrete at the same time” (Proner, 2006, p.432). He 
believes that patients are looking for words to anchor experiences that are often 
ineffable or inchoate, and thus “giving a name to the powerful emotional experience 
                                                17	  Patrick	  Casement	  is	  a	  British	  psychoanalyst	  whose	  writing	  has	  been	  influential	  in	  the	  broader	  psychotherapy	  world,	  see	  Casement	  (1985,	  1990,	  2002	  and	  2006).	  18	  For	  a	  helpful	  review	  on	  Griffin’s	  work,	  see	  Sybil	  Ginsburg	  (2016). 
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that is not yet mentally represented” (p. 430). This is how Griffin has characterised 
the active nature of evenly hovering attention: 
 
When I am working well and I am in what Freud called ‘evenly hovering attention’ 
and Bion called ‘reverie’, I can listen most deeply and unconscious meanings are 
more accessible. Words can stand out that in another context or at another time may 
have no more than ordinary or trivial significance. (Griffin, 2016, p. 426, emphasis 
added) 
 
In this context, it is puzzling to find theorists who have interpreted Freud’s or Bion’s 
recommendation in rather mystifying ways. For example, the Lacanian analyst Bruce 
Fink (2007) remarks that evenly hovering attention is “to hear without 
understanding”, without doing anything or imposing any meaning to the “ribbon of 
sound” produced by the patient (p. 12 and p. 21). One wonders how therapy could 
proceed on the basis of ribbons of sound? Such negation of words is unhelpful to say 
the least.   
  
However, there is one thing I would debate with Griffin. In his paper, he has alluded 
to the importance of finding the “right word”. I am not sure if it is possible, or 
desirable, to be definitive about what the right word is. I would argue it is important 
always to be tentative: the “right word” might be right one moment, but “not-right” 
the next. The certainty one achieves today may easily be overturned by what happens 
tomorrow. Transience or impermanence is a fact of existence. This is the Buddhist 
insight that psychoanalysis should learn from. 
Buddhism and Mindfulness 
In its origin, Buddhism was a philosophy of life rather than a religion. As Safran 
(2003b) has pointed out, metaphysical and cosmological speculations are irrelevant to 
Buddhist philosophy. It is not an ontological theory; its aim is to relieve human 
suffering. The Buddhist idea of impermanence (emptiness or nothingness) is about 
seeing through the transience and changeability of life, not a metaphysical declaration 
regarding the origin or essence of existence. Thus Buddhist insights are about how to 
live. Whether ontologically there is any substance to anything is not of great concern. 
Existence as such is phenomenologically accepted, and the task is to “get on with it”. 
In this sense, Buddhism does not reject a realist model of the world. Buddhist ethics 
has to do with accumulating “virtuous conduct”, which entails actions (of goodness) 
in the real, physical world. This forms the basis for moral virtues such as compassion, 
which many contemporary psychotherapists have espoused in their practice, 
particularly those influenced by Buddhism. 
 
The Buddhist idea of learning to see through the impermanence of all that exists is an 
important one ― it encourages a temperament that is not fixated on “Truth”. This is 
what psychoanalysis should embrace: it is not a matter of the truth of analytic 
interpretations that is important, it is their usefulness (or otherwise) in helping the 
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patient live a good life that counts.19 Thus, psychoanalysis is an ethical practice, not a 
“scientific” one as narrowly conceived. In German (Freud’s working language), the 
word for “science” (Wissenschaft) is the same as that for “knowledge”, with a much 
wider range of meaning. The Latin root of “science” is to know (“scientia”), which is 
far from the mechanistic, laboratory connotations that the word conjures up in many 
people’s mind in the English-speaking world. An ethical practice has to be based on 
how and what we know about the world (based on “science”), even if such knowledge 
is incomplete, approximate, tentative or even defective. It is in this wider context of 
“science” that psychoanalysis might converge with Buddhism. 
 
Understood as a practical philosophy, the conundrums within Buddhist thinking ― 
the idea of “no-self-ness”, “emptiness”, or the world as illusory ― are easier to grasp. 
Quoting the well-know declaration of Harvard psychotherapist Jack Engler, the 
Slovenian analyst Borut Škodlar (2016) said “you have to be somebody before you 
can be nobody” (p. 128). This is one way of resolving the paradox of “no-self-ness”. 
Even though the world is concretely there and suffering is real, we can, and have to, 
live as if they are but empty. This is what Buddha believes to be the basis for 
transcending suffering. To be “somebody but also nobody” does not remove the 
person from participating in the world. Zen teaching is particularly this-worldly and is 
not trapped in any ontological maze. I believe it is Zen that would most benefit the 
practice of psychotherapy.20 
 
Most readers know that mindfulness practice is a discipline of staying with the 
present, dwelling in silence, and paying attention to all that there is with curiosity and 
an open and non-judgemental attitude. The rhythm of breathing is used as an anchor 
to help the practitioner stay with now and let go of thinking. Simply noticing and 
accepting (even of the practitioner’s own wandering mind) is all that is required. This 
description, though cursory, already suggests an affinity between mindfulness and 
Freud’s evenly hovering attention or Bion’s no-memory-no-desire reverie.  
 
Like psychoanalysts, mindfulness practitioners place great emphasis on the idea of 
neutrality, albeit with a different nuance. In meditation, being neutral and detached 
means the practice is not about success or failure, or striving to achieve anything, but 
simply staying with a moment-by-moment awareness. There is no duality of body and 
mind (e.g., the physical practice of archery is also a practice of the mind); and no 
duality between the mind and the world (I am the arrow). As such, mindfulness 
becomes second nature: as the stream of my consciousness, as my being. This 
experience of “now” is an indwelling in the world unique to human subjectivity.21 
                                                19	  The	  Chicago	  philosopher	  and	  psychoanalyst	  Jonathan	  Lear	  has	  made	  a	  strong	  case	  for	  the	  view	  that	  the	  practice	  of	  psychoanalysis	  is	  about	  how	  to	  live	  a	  good	  life	  (see	  Lear	  1998,	  2004,	  2014).	  20	  Zen	  is	  much	  more	  than	  just	  meditation,	  even	  though	  the	  Chinese	  word	  for	  Zen	  (禪)	  does	  mean	  meditation.	  The	  practice	  of	  Kōan	  (stories	  or	  riddles	  that	  have	  no	  logical	   solution)	   as	   a	   way	   of	   grasping	   the	   paradoxical	   nature	   of	   the	   human	  condition,	  is	  part	  and	  parcel	  of	  Zen.	  21 	  The	   understanding	   of	   mindfulness	   as	   an	   experiential	   me-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world	  perspective	  is	  rarely	  commented	  on;	  this	  aspect	  of	  mindfulness	  has,	  in	  my	  view,	  a	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There are many questions about mindfulness practice still being debated. Is it possible 
to be “just noticing” and nothing else? What does noticing mean anyway? Isn’t 
noticing a form of thinking? But isn’t there an understanding of meditation as “not-
thinking”? How can this paradox be resolved? Is it possible to achieve a completely 
uncluttered mind? Can we ever suspend judgement totally, or is it not the case that 
being conscious means making judgement (moral or otherwise) all the time? These 
questions can also be directed at the psychoanalytic idea of no-memory-no-desire or 
evenly hovering attention. They reflect a commonality between the two.   
 
Furthermore, there is a paradox about the non-striving attitude of mindfulness: if we 
stop striving altogether, what does disciplined meditative practice entail? Doesn’t 
such practice require effort ― a form of striving towards an end? Another paradox: Is 
mindfulness a language-based practice? Think of what mindfulness teachers are doing 
when leading a meditative exercise ― words are used to capture and hold the 
attention of the practitioners. Would these words trap the mind, thus negating the idea 
of emptying the mind? These questions are not raised to reject mindfulness, but to 
widen the horizon for exploration.  
 
It is important to say that neither Buddhism nor mindfulness practice is anti-rational. 
As the Bodhidharma has said, “Many roads lead to the Path, but basically there are 
only two: reason and practice” (Bodhidharma, 1987, p. 3). Both reason and practice 
are part of the Buddhist discipline of life: “Buddha means awareness, the awareness 
of body and mind that prevent evil from arising in either. And to invoke means to call 
to mind, to call constantly to mind the rules of discipline and to follow them with all 
your might” (Bodhidharma, 1987, p. 111). On this basis, it is not unreasonable to say 
that mindfulness does involve subjectivity (the phenomenal experience of the “I”) in 
the context of striving in a particular direction (“invoking rules of discipline”). 
 
What mindfulness can learn from psychoanalysis is the acknowledgement of the 
unconscious ― that the mind has a depth which is more than we are able to fathom.22 
The significance of the unconscious dimension of human experience cannot be 
ignored. To that extent, to empty the mind is not a task that can ever be achieved, and 
mindful attentiveness is never an act always under the conscious control of the person. 
Such understanding may help to alleviate a practitioner’s sense of failure of not 
achieving complete blankness of the mind. More importantly, such acknowledgement 
may also help the mindfulness community learn to tackle some of the meditation-
related (sometimes severe) psychic or emotional difficulties that practitioners might 
encounter.    
 
One danger, as I see it, is that mindfulness has not only become a popular therapy 
modality, but also a burgeoning enterprise that has entered into mainstream society, in 
healthcare, schools, public institutions or the business and management world, almost 
as a panacea for all ills (e.g., see Crane 2017). It is important to see mindfulness as a 
                                                                                                                                       strong	  affinity	  with	  the	  philosophical	  tradition	  of	  phenomenology	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  intentionality.	  22	  Of	   course	   the	   notion	   of	   the	   “mind”	   is	   a	   contested	   one.	   I	   am	   using	   it	   as	  shorthand	  for	  how	  we	  experience	  phenomenal	  subjectivity	  (the	  sense	  of	  “I”)	  (See	  Li,	  2018).	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reflexive and reflective way of life rather than a technique. When something becomes 
a therapy technology or a brand of merchandise, and is packaged and put on sale, 
there is a high probability that it would become corrupted.23 
 
The interest psychoanalysts have shown toward Buddhism or meditation is not new. 
There is a considerable literature which this paper will not have space to address, 
ranging from Carl Jung’s or Erich Fromm’s well-known texts (Jung, 1978; Suzuki, 
Fromm & de Martino, 1960), to more recent studies by various analysts (e.g., 
Falkenström, 2003; Leone, 1995; Lin & Seiden, 2014; Mace, 2008; Makise, 2017; 
Moncayo, 2012; Safran, 2003a; Suler, 1995; Young-Eisendrath & Muramoto 2002). 
Some of these works are not particularly helpful, such as Makise (2017) or Moncayo 
(2012), with inaccessible theoretical baggage couched in esoteric (Lacanian) 
language. 
 
In the cognitive-behaviour therapy tradition (CBT), mindfulness has also had great 
impact, as can be seen in publications ranging from the popular text Mindfulness-
Based Cognitive Therapy for Depression (Segal, Williams & Teasdale, 2002), to 
Compassion-Focussed Therapy (e.g., Gilbert, 2009), Dialectical Behaviour Therapy 
(e.g., Linehan, 1993), or Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (e.g., Hayes, 2002; 
Hayes et al., 2006). Of course mindfulness has attracted other therapists as well, 
including the somatic or body-oriented psychotherapies (e.g., Weiss, 2009) and 
Emotion-Focused Therapy (Geller & Greenberg, 2012).   
 
In this context, Škodlar’s question is of interest: “Where in the landscape of 
psychotherapy would be an appropriate place for mindfulness? Is cognitive-behavior 
therapy (CBT) really the most suitable area within which to locate a mindfulness-
oriented approach?” (Škodlar, 2016, p. 126). 
 
Škodlar’s answer is that mindfulness has the most affinity with existentialist or 
phenomenological psychotherapy. He says, “one cannot think of many more suitable 
adjectives to add to mindfulness than existential, and it is certainly more appropriate 
than cognitive, analytic or systemic” (Škodlar, 2016, p. 128). That, unfortunately, runs 
the risk of turning mindfulness into a specific brand rather than acknowledging it as 
the fundamental attitude (or way of being) that all psychotherapists should cultivate.   
The Tango of Psychoanalysis with Mindfulness 
One area of discussion, in terms of the rapprochement between psychoanalysis and 
mindfulness, is the question of what the “self” is and how Buddhism and 
psychoanalysis converge or diverge in this respect (see, e.g., Falkenström, 2003 or 
Sular, 1995). Usually the attempt is to postulate various structures of the self (core 
self, self-structure, selfobject, the observing self, etc), and compare and contrast how 
Buddhist ideas and psychoanalytic theories might come together in this respect.  
 
However, such discussion often gets lost in a theoretical labyrinth that is not helpful 
to practitioners. Falkenström’s (2003) attempt to resolve the contradiction between 
the psychoanalytic concept of self and the Buddhist idea of “no-self-ness” fails 
                                                23 	  One	   useful	   review	   of	   the	   ethical	   problems	   the	   burgeoning	   mindfulness	  movement	  faces	  is	  Harrington	  &	  Dunne	  (2015).  
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because, in my view, a structural model of the self does not do justice to lived 
experience. To me, the “self” is a way of speaking about the experiencing of 
subjectivity ― it is in the practical living in and amongst people, in interactions and 
mutual interrogations that the self becomes meaningful. To think of the self in terms 
of the contents of the mind (mental representations, hierarchical differentiation within 
the self-system, etc) reifies the dynamic, phenomenal experiencing of being a 
(material) subject. 
 
Theorising about the self as a system of mental representations, like what Falkenström 
has done, does not chime with the Buddhist sense of “no-self-ness”, which is pointing 
to the ineffable, non-structural nature of subjectivity. While Falkenström has 
expressed doubt about the concept of the “self”, he still gets muddled in trying to 
explain his idea. Just take one of his propositions: “When the individual has identified 
with part of experience as ‘self’, there will inevitably be threats to this self…” 
(Falkenström, 2003, p. 9). One wonders who (or what) the “individual” is, and 
whether this “individual” already exists prior to, and separately from the “self” that 
appears later on in the sentence. Or perhaps Falkenström is saying that “experience” 
constitutes (becomes) the self which the individual then identifies with? But does this 
dualism make sense? 
 
Many psychoanalysts are more concerned about the therapeutic aspects of 
mindfulness than theories about the self. Kathleen Speeth (1982) discusses the 
importance for the psychotherapist to maintain both focused and panoramic attention 
“in both direction” (i.e., to herself and to the other person), and refers to meditation 
techniques of various Eastern traditions, including Zen practice. In her view, Freud’s 
evenly hovering attention represents panoramic attention, which resonates with 
mindfulness. She has also coined the phrase “witness consciousness” (p. 155) ― 
similar to Casement’s (1985) “internal supervisor” ― which could be construed as 
meta-level observation essential for keeping a detached view of the therapeutic 
process. 
 
While many therapists have espoused mindfulness practice as therapy tool, some go 
further and commit themselves to a Buddhist way of life ― the late Jeremy Safran, a 
widely respected Canadian-born but New York-based psychoanalyst was one of 
them. 24  In reviewing Safran’s 2012 text Psychoanalysis and Psychoanalytic 
Therapies, British psychotherapist Jeremy Holmes remarks on the importance of 
Safran’s commitment to Buddhism: 
 
[T]he book is permeated by Safran’s Buddhist background. He discusses the 
tension between the meliorist American dream of unlimited possibility of psychic 
change and unbounded optimism, with Freud’s rational pessimism and stoicism. 
                                                24	  Clinical	  psychologist	  and	  relational	  psychoanalyst	  Jeremy	  Safran	  has	  produced	  important	  work	  about	  the	  dialogue	  between	  Buddhism	  and	  psychoanalysis	  (e.g.,	  Safran,	   2003a).	   His	   recent	   tragic	   death	   is	   a	   great	   loss	   to	   psychotherapy	  ―	   see	  https://tricycle.org/trikedaily/remembering-­‐buddhist-­‐psychoanalyst-­‐jeremy-­‐safran/	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From a Buddhist perspective, the paradox is that the more one can come to accept 
oneself and the world as it is, the more one is in a position to change both. (Holmes, 
2013, p. 103) 
 
Pessimism and stoicism are seen here as conducive to the development of resilience, 
and this echoes what Lin & Seiden (2014) say about psychoanalysis and Buddhist 
mindfulness philosophy as “the turning toward distress rather than turning away from 
it” (p. 4). That is, both perspectives are regarded as being honest in their acceptance of 
the reality of suffering in the world. The Buddhist practice of “no-self-ness” is what 
analysts like Safran believe to be an effective means for coping with inevitable 
suffering. This is not a denial of existence, but a way of grasping its transience. As 
van Waning (2002) has said: “The Buddha did not say, ‘You don’t exist,’ but rather, 
‘You have no self.’ His point was not to deny or reject the self, but to recognize the 
self-representation as representation, as a concept without existence of its own”. (p. 
93) 
 
To embrace the paradox of transience, it would be incumbent on us to acknowledge 
that we know, and yet we know we don’t know. This is radical openness (similar to 
negative capability discussed above). It is a paradoxicality that sets us free. To quote 
Safran: 
 
In Buddhist constructivism, the primary thrust is to cultivate a radical sense of 
openness. The belief is that concepts enslave us and that the tendency toward 
reification creates suffering. The emphasis is not on constructing adaptive 
narratives but rather on the radical deconstruction of all narratives. It is interesting 
to note that this emphasis on radical openness is similar in some respects to the 
growing awareness in analytic thinking of the importance of the analyst’s openness 
and tolerance of ambiguity. (Safran, 2003b, p. 22) 
 
Perhaps Freud was enslaved by his craving to be right, and this had blinkered him. 
Within the Buddhist perspective, craving is the source of suffering as it leads to 
illusions. What psychoanalysts can learn from Buddhism or mindfulness practice is, 
as Safran has suggested, to give up such craving and embrace radical openness. 
Letting go of concepts that shackle intelligence, theories that diminish horizon and 
fixed self-identifies that restrict imagination may yet provide psychoanalysis with an 
opportunity for renewal. Embracing impermanence and emptiness ― this will be 
psychoanalysis in a mindfulness frame. 
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Mindfulness, Psychoanalysis and Mentalisation 
It is not uncommon to find inexperienced therapists confusing mindfulness with 
mentalisation. The latter is a relatively recent development within the psychodynamic 
tradition, originally with a specific focus on working with people struggling with 
borderline personality difficulties. Anthony Bateman and Peter Fonagy (2004, 2006), 
two London-based psychoanalytically trained psychotherapists, have pioneered this 
approach. At the beginning, Bateman and Fonagy said mentalisation is “a focus for 
therapy rather than a specific therapy in itself” (2006, p.159) ― it is what all good 
therapy should be like. Sadly, like much else in the psychotherapy world, 
mentalisation has now become packaged and widely advertised in the therapy 
“market-place”. 
 
This is not an appropriate place to go into a lengthy exposition of the mentalisation 
perspective; suffice it to say it is a therapeutic framework based on the concept of 
“mind-mindedness”. Or, to put it simply, it is a style of working that constantly 
attends to what is happening in a person’s mind.25 The therapist is not only focusing 
on understanding the thinking, reasoning or feeling of the patient, but most 
importantly, on how the latter attributes motives or intention to other people’s actions. 
Furthermore, the therapist is trying to foster the same reflective capacity in the patient 
so that the latter can gradually learn to grasp the mind of others (hence “mind-
mindedness”). 
 
Thus mentalisation is about “keeping mind in mind” (own mind and others’ minds), 
not making up the mind too quickly (keeping an open mind or “not knowing” stance), 
and being curious about the mind, in order to understand what is going on in one’s 
own mind and in the minds of other people. To be able to mentalise is to be able to 
use language effectively: to move from the concrete (language as literal 
representation) to the symbolic (language as metaphorical), thus moving from 
(impulsive, physical) action to (discursive) articulation, i.e., to be able to talk (e.g., 
about a problem) rather than act blindly (e.g., hitting out to solve a dispute). 
Mentalisation is about intersubjectivity, about relating to another person as a thinking 
and speaking subject. Although it is not a form of psychoanalysis, mentalisation does 
have roots in the analytic tradition. The capacity for mentalising is likely to help 
sustain an analyst’s evenly hovering attention.   
 
Inspired by the seminal work of Hans Loewald (1960), Jonathan Lear (2003) has 
written an essay about “objectivity”,26 by which he does not mean the kind of 
positivist, reductionistic, “the world is what it is” realism that places unquestioning 
faith on quantitative measurements. Rather, he talks about the “subjective sense of 
objectivity” (Lear, 2003, p. 49) which entails a recognition that the world is made up 
of other subjects whose subjectivity one has to reckon with and try to understand 
(although they seem like “objects” out there). Such acknowledgement of 
intersubjectivity constitutes true objectivity, as Lear understands it. To me, the idea of 
the “subjective sense of objectivity” is another way of describing a person’s capacity 
for mentalisation. 
                                                
25 Conceptually, it is similar to the idea of “theory of mind” in the field of autistic 
spectrum disorder studies. 
26 Chapter 2 “Subjectivity, Objectivity, and Irony” in Lear (2003). 
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There are important differences between mindfulness and mentalisation ― emptying 
the mind vs knowing the mind; detachment vs balanced attachment; absence of goals 
vs relationality and intentionality ― but they do share similar concerns. Presence is 
indispensable to both; and both are respectful of and curious about the mind. 
Falkenström (2012) has made an attempt to bring mindfulness, mentalisation and 
psychological mindedness under the rubric of self-observation. This highlights the 
subjective grasp of phenomenal experiencing as central to both mindfulness and 
mentalisation (despite the paradoxical Buddhist idea of “no-self-ness”). 
 
While acknowledging the differences between mentalisation and mindfulness, Chris 
Mace (2008) has commented on the advantage of bringing them together:  
 
[M]entalization, a capacity that enhances what Fonagy has termed ‘reflective self 
function’ through an articulated appreciation of minds (our own and those of 
others) as the locus of personal history, affect, thought and action, is quite 
orthogonal to the pre-reflective capacity that is mindful awareness. In practice, 
development of the two functions can be therapeutically synergistic” (p. 126). 
 
The idea of synergy suggested by Mace points to the possibility of alliance that would 
benefit both. However, it is important to bear in mind that mindfulness and 
mentalisation are not so much theory as practice. Any theorising of either must be a 
reflection of the experience of mindfulness or mentalisation in reflexive practice, 
where the process, rather than content, is the focus. 
Performativity 
Psychoanalysis, mindfulness and mentalisation share the commonality of openness 
towards the phenomenal experience of subjectivity (the “I” experience). At its best, 
such openness signifies an honest seeking of understanding of subjectivity, 
notwithstanding the fact that full understanding is impossible. In this regard, the 
practice of subjectivity could be profitably explored in terms of the concept of 
performativity.   
 
Witness a mindfulness teacher in action: he shows the earnestness of an evangelical 
preacher, with beguiling intonation, inflection of voice, and subtle or not so subtle 
gestures, even the expression in his face (albeit with eyes closed) ― coaxing the 
participants to follow the meditative exercise. Knowingly or unknowingly, he is 
performing to an audience, even though most of the participants have kept their eyes 
shut. 
 
Nowadays, most therapists are keen to point out that they have embraced mindfulness 
not as religion (Buddhism), but as a mental discipline beneficial to therapy work. 
Nevertheless, there is often a touch of liturgy in the gatherings of mindfulness 
practitioners, such as beginning and ending with group meditative practice, not 
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dissimilar to prayers in a religious meeting, even if the mindfulness event is a research 
or academic seminar. I bring this up not as criticism, but to highlight performativity 
within the “mindfulness community”. 
 
While performativity is a modern concept, the phenomenon it seeks to describe is not 
new. The performative has always been an important element of the cultural history of 
the human species, most noticeably in religious practices and the dramatic art. In the 
contemporary art scene, performance art is becoming a highly visible practice.27 
According to Fischer-Lichte (2004/2008), one major aspect of the performative can be 
described as how to do things with words. (The emphasis here is “to do things”.) Two 
important qualities of the performative are embodiment of the dramatic 
(“materializing of possibilities”) and independence from pre-existing categories or 
essence (the “non-referential” nature of performative acts). As such, the performative 
is “of crucial importance in constituting bodily as well as social identity” (Fischer-
Lichte, 2004/2008, p. 27). Religious rituals or liturgies are performative in that they 
constitute identities and realities.28 The practice of mindfulness, like prayers, can be 
performed publicly or in private. In both situations, it is constitutive of the identity of 
the practitioner(s).  
 
Drawing from Shakespeare’s work, Cox and Theilgaard (1987) suggest that silence in 
psychotherapy is not always evidence of resistance, as it is a recurrent feature in the 
unfolding of the human story within therapeutic space, and the precise meaning of the 
silence “only emerges in performance” (p. 3 – 4). In this regard, the reticence of the 
analyst can be seen as part and parcel of a performative set-up. Freud has indicated 
that he “cannot bear to be stared at for eight hours a day or longer” (Freud, 
1913/2002, p. 55) and has laid down a rule about the analyst sitting behind the patient 
(who is lying on the couch).29 This requirement has then become theoretically 
justified. Such a seating arrangement resembles the director sitting behind the camera, 
controlling the performance of the actors and film crew.  
 
It is possible to view free association as the performance the analysand has to deliver: 
a creative and improvised act, through which a narrative, even if incoherent, emerges. 
However, no matter how “free” the patient’s associations seem to be, they are of 
necessity contextual, motivated, sometimes rhetorical, always for a purpose, with or 
without the patient’s awareness. It is often the case that patients conform to the 
analyst’s theory when “performing” free association, as if following the analyst’s 
(invisible) script. This is not to say the patient’s account is fictitious. Its 
performativity resides in the quasi-liturgical function it fulfils, whether seen as 
Catholic confessional or other forms of religious/dramatic catharsis. This 
performativity is crucial in constituting the analysand within the analytic frame. 
 
To think about psychoanalysis and mindfulness as performative does not detract from 
their therapeutic possibilities. Rituals, religious or otherwise, are essential for the re-
                                                27	  See,	  e.g.,	  Marina	  Abramović’s	  work:	  https://mai.art	  28 	  For	   example,	   the	   Eucharist	   (the	   “Lord’s	   Supper”)	   is,	   in	   Catholicism,	   a	  performative	  act	  that	  becomes	  the	   literal	  reality	  of	  Christ’s	  body	  and	  blood	  (the	  doctrine	  of	  transubstantiation).	  29	  Freud	  explicitly	  said	  this	  was	  his	  “personal	  motive”	  for	  using	  the	  couch	  ―	  but	  the	  personal	  whim	  of	  the	  founding	  father	  has	  escaped	  analysis. 
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enchantment of subjectivity (the “I” experience) and of the world, as they are 
generative of meanings and identities. Rituals can be curative, even if their truth-value 
is impossible to ascertain.  
Freud’s Performative Act 
If performativity constitutes identity, there is no doubt that Freud’s status as the 
infallible Founding Father of psychoanalysis is underpinned by his performative act. 
 
“Long experience had taught me, as it might anyone else…” (Freud, 2002, p. 3); 
“Experience tells us…” (p. 24); “Analysis has shown…” (p. 26); “Experience has 
taught us…” (p. 173). You can almost see Freud say all this with a flourish ― his 
waving of the hand confirming the truth of what he is going to say. His way of talking 
(and writing) undergirds the truth of his ideas, the basis of which lies in what he 
himself has done and experienced. His performative act is declarative. It is the 
performativity of Freud’s work that has generated the whole edifice of 
psychoanalysis.  
 
In the words of Adam Phillips: 
 
Freud was always puzzled about what he was writing about when he was writing 
about psychoanalysis. His writing ― in which he can be so apparently lucid and 
fair in describing the obscurity and the derangement of what he calls the 
unconscious ― is a performing of this puzzle. There is far more speculation and 
conjecture in his writing, more theory-making and story-telling, than instruction or 
even guidelines about the actual practice of psychoanalysis (and his case histories 
are nothing if not tributes to the cult of his personality; they are not easily replicable 
or imitable experiments). (Phillips, 2002, p. x, emphasis added) 
 
It is the story-telling nature of Freud’s work that is so interesting, particularly from 
the vantage point of performativity, even though, as Phillips has pointed out in the 
above passage, Freud’s performative act sometimes reflects his own contradiction. Of 
course Freud’s patients are not his fictional invention; the point is, the psychological 
world in which Freud has situated his patients is very much his creation. His (written) 
cases always develop in such a way as to confirm his theories, even if the therapy 
itself fails to cure the patient.  
 
Adam Phillips has suggested that: “If Freud had died, at the age of forty-nine, having 
completed these five books,30 psychoanalysis would have been very different, but it 
                                                30	  The	  five	  books	  are:	  The	  Interpretation	  of	  Dreams	  (1900),	  The	  Psychopathology	  
of	  Everyday	  Life	  (1904),	  Three	  Essays	  on	  the	  Theory	  of	  Sexuality	  (1905),	  Jokes	  and	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would have been sufficiently complete” (Phillips 2014, p. 145). He does not think 
Freud’s later work (structural theory of the mind, concept of death drive, or writings 
on religion and cultural issues) is important to the essence of psychoanalysis. The 
“early Freud” is risk-taking, speculative, bold and more open to possibilities, whereas 
the established Freud has become a structure, a grand theory, an institution (in both 
senses of the word). If he had died in 1905/1906, there might not be a psychoanalytic 
empire or a founding deity. To me, the “mature” Freud has taken on a different 
performativity, one which has restricted the horizon of psychoanalysis. In this context, 
it is plausible to suggest that both the performative and the improvisational could, if 
practised with an open mind, extend the horizon and bring the imaginative to bear on 
the ordinary, thus generating realms of meanings hitherto unexplored. 
 
The challenge is how not to turn Freud into a god. Psychoanalysis can be radical, as 
Safran has remarked: 
 
We have seen how both Buddhism and psychoanalysis have struggled over time 
with the tension between the poles of agnosticism or atheism versus faith and 
commitment. Within psychoanalysis the tendency to deify Freud and to treat his 
words as gospel can be seen as another form of the return of the repressed. (Safran, 
2003b, p. 21)  
Identity and Performativity 
According to Jonathan Lear, the commitment to becoming a psychoanalyst is a 
foundational performative act: 
 
“[A]s psychoanalysts, we are constantly in the process of shaping ourselves as 
psychoanalysts… We strive to shape ourselves into people who can listen well… 
This is a process of becoming a certain kind of a person… Being a psychoanalyst is 
in part a never-ending task of bringing oneself back to the activity of being a 
psychoanalyst… To put it paradoxically: to be an analyst one must ever be in the 
process of becoming an analyst. (Lear, 2003, p. 32) 
 
To Lear, the commitment of an analyst to psychoanalysis must be total ― it is not a 
one-off exercise limited in scope and in time; instead, it should permeate the whole of 
the analyst’s life. As Lear sees it, however, to be a psychoanalyst is not a matter of 
                                                                                                                                       
their	  Relation	  to	  the	  Unconscious	  (1905),	  and	  Fragment	  of	  an	  Analysis	  of	  a	  Case	  of	  
Hysteria	  (Dora)	  (1905).	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following Freud (or any of the other early analysts),31 or of choosing a career; it is a 
specific project of being/becoming a person, and thus a life-long moral practice. 
Similarly, Bion has suggested that negative capability should become a way of life for 
the analyst, and mindfulness teachers always say, unequivocally, that meditation is 
not a therapy technique but an indwelling in a particular form of being. Here, no 
doubt, is where psychoanalysis and mindfulness converge. 
Concluding Remarks 
Words and silence are both essential to psychotherapy, as they embody the 
performative in the intersubjective world of the therapeutic space. As Cox and 
Theilgaard (1987) have said, psychotherapy is concerned with “the significance of the 
changing eloquence of silence” (p.3), and, I would add, with the vicissitude of words. 
How a psychotherapist manages to balance between silences and words is a 
continuing learning process. While bearing in mind all the caveats discussed in this 
essay, it is perhaps not unreasonable to say that “evenly suspended attention”, within 
a mindfulness frame and maintaining full respect towards “other minds” ― or, the 
mindfulness stance with a deep awareness of the unconscious dimension of 
subjectivity ― constitutes a crucial starting point in this learning process. It is, 
ultimately, a matter of learning to listen, and learning to speak from listening. 
 
A human story “performed” within therapeutic space always starts from an arbitrary 
point in time. The story often goes round in circles and criss-crosses different worlds 
in a zigzagging, meandering way, getting entangled with seemingly irrelevant details 
and detours, sometimes in a direction that may surprise one or both participants. 
There is a lot of to-ing and fro-ing, of mixing and blending, of veering on a tangent, 
but the repeated play is not repetitive, as consciousness is never linear or neat and 
tidy, but full of random and messy bits and pieces, repetitions, diversions and cul-de-
sacs. When all the strands eventually come together ― if they do come together (as 
they might not) ― the experience may be like what T. S. Eliot has famously said, We 
shall not cease from exploration/And the end of all our exploring/Will be to arrive 
where we started/And know the place for the first time.32 
 
Rowan Williams, former Archbishop of Canterbury, was in New York on 11th 
September 2001, a few streets away from the World Trade Centre. He was in a church 
meeting when the world was shattered by the unimaginably brutal terrorist acts 
perpetrated on the twin towers. In 2002, he published a pamphlet, just over 80 pocket-
sized pages long, of his reflections on the cataclysmic event of 9/11. In this piece of 
writing, Williams talks about his experience of an “empty space”: 
 
In that time, there is no possibility of thinking, of explanations, of resolutions. I 
can’t remember much sense of panic, much feeling about the agony going on a 
                                                31	  This	  is	  how	  Lear	  (2014)	  puts	  it:	  “…	  if	  psychoanalysis	  is	  to	  live	  up	  to	  its	  promise	  of	  being	  a	  moral	  psychology	  —	  one	  which	  contributes	  as	  it	  comes	  to	  understand	  what	  it	  is	  to	  lead	  a	  full,	  rich,	  meaningful	  human	  life	  —	  it	  must	  find	  ways	  to	  mourn	  Freud’s	  legacy,	  and	  move	  on.”	  (p.	  480).	  
32 From T. S. Eliot’s 1942 poem Little Gidding, in Quartet No 4 of Four Quartets, 
Faber & Faber 2001 paperback edition  
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couple of hundred yards away, let alone much desire for justice or vengeance. It 
was an empty space…. But somehow the emptiness ‘resources’ us. (Williams, 2002, 
p. 10-11, emphasis added)33 
 
Of course the terror of 9/11 is of a different order compared to the pain and suffering 
of patients that most psychotherapists encounter in their day-to-day work. 
Nevertheless, the “empty space” (silence and stillness) that Williams has described 
resonates with both the psychoanalytic silence of evenly hovering attention as well as 
the fully present awareness of the mindfulness perspective. It is in such silence and 
stillness that true listening occurs. And then words of healing might return. 
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